The third Bureau meeting of the Socialist International in 1977 was held in Madrid on October 15-16, 1977, at the invitation of the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE). Willy Brandt chaired the meeting, which was attended by 77 participants (see list below) and 29 guests.

The participants included five Vice-Presidents of the Socialist International: Leopold S. Senghor, President of Senegal; Bruno Kreisky, Chancellor of Austria; Olof Palme, Chairman of the Swedish Social Democratic Party; Irene Petry, Chairman of the International Council of Social Democratic Women; and Anselmo Sule, Chairman of the Radical Party of Chile.

Among the guests were Otto Kersten, General Secretary of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions; Frank Barnaby, Director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute; a delegation of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) of Mexico led by the party’s President, Carlos Sansores Pérez; a group of six parliamentarians from the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB); Guillermo Manuel Ungo, General Secretary of the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) of El Salvador; B. P. Koirala, leader of the Nepali Congress Party and former Prime Minister of Nepal; and representatives of the National Liberation Front (FLN) of Algeria; the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP) of Morocco (the USFP delegation being led by Abderrahim Bouabdil, General Secretary of the party), the Socialist Party of Uruguay, the Polisario Front and the Janata Party of India.

Felipe Gonzalez, General Secretary of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party, made an opening statement to the meeting.

The main issue on the agenda was “Problems of Disarmament” — a particularly topical issue, in view of the current Belgrade follow-up conference to the 1975 Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, the special session on disarmament of the United Nations General Assembly to be held in 1978 and the present situation regarding the SALT and MBFR talks. This subject was introduced by Willy Brandt and Frank Barnaby and the paper prepared by the former is published below (that of the latter being a summary of the three articles published in Socialist Affairs 4/1977, 5/1977 and this issue).

Three other major questions were also discussed. The report on the Socialist International mission to southern Africa was presented by the leader of the mission, Olof Palme (see elsewhere in this issue). A proposal regarding the discussion of the Middle East problem was presented by Bruno Kreisky and one on Western Sahara, by Felipe Gonzalez.

Among the decisions taken by the meeting were the following:
(a) That the General Secretary should prepare for the Bureau meeting to be held in Hamburg on February 9-10, 1978, proposals for a programme of action by the Socialist International with regard to disarmament:
(b) To adopt the report of the Socialist International mission to southern Africa, which visited Angola, Zambia, Botswana, Mozambique and Tanzania on September 2-11, 1977, under the leadership (in Angola, Zambia, Mozambique and Tanzania) of Olof Palme, Chairman of the Swedish Social Democratic Party, and (in Botswana) of Kjeld Olesen, Vice-Chairman of the Danish Social Democratic Party. The report contained a nine-point programme of action which can be summarised as follows:

- a halt to all arms exports to South Africa and all military cooperation with its government;
- to work for the prohibition of new investments and of the export of capital to South Africa and Namibia;
- to work for increased support to the front line states;
- political support to the liberation movements (ANC of South Africa, Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe and SWAPO of Namibia), humanitarian aid and material support for peaceful purposes;
- governments should be encouraged to contribute to efforts in southern Africa towards regional cooperation, aiming at reducing dependency on South Africa;
- a halt to the flow of mercenaries to the racist regimes;
- intensification of solidarity work for the liberation of southern Africa;
- governments should assist popular movements (including political parties, trade unions, churches and other socio-political groups) working in support of the liberation struggle in southern Africa;

The Bureau asked the General Secretary to draw this nine-point programme to the attention of the member parties, and to remain in contact with parties as regards its implementation. It was also agreed to undertake joint action with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions against apartheid.

(c) To accept a proposal by Bruno Kreisky that the Socialist International should organise a round-table conference on the Middle East with representatives of the Israeli labour movement and of the other member parties of the Socialist International.

(d) To adopt unanimously the position with regard to the situation in the Western Sahara expressed in the text published below.

(e) To adopt, as guidelines for the work of the Socialist International Committee for Solidarity with Chile, the principles and recommendations for action reflected by the consensus of the Conference on Chile held in Rotterdam on August 29-31, 1977 [see SOCIALIST AFFAIRS, 5/1977]; and to request the Committee for Solidarity with Chile to submit to the Bureau a programme of action for 1978:

(f) That, in order to focus more attention on Latin American problems, one Bureau meeting should be held in Latin America during each inter-Congress period following
the 1978 Vancouver Congress of the Socialist International.

(g) That the Socialist International mission to Latin America which was to have visited Mexico, Costa Rica, Venezuela and the Dominican Republic on October 17-27, 1977, under the leadership of Mario Soares, Prime Minister of Portugal and Vice-President of the Socialist International, should be postponed until 1978.

(h) To postpone the discussion on Argentina until the Bureau meeting in Hamburg, in order to allow for a paper to be presented by the Argentinian member party of the Socialist International, the Partido Socialista Popular.

(i) That, in connection with the Socialist International's intensified activities with regard to Latin America, Hector Oqueli (El Salvador) should be appointed to the staff of the Socialist International secretariat, to deal with Latin American affairs.

(j) To adopt a budget for the Socialist International for 1977 which is double the size of the 1976 budget.

(k) That the two principal themes of the Bureau meeting to be held in Hamburg on February 9-10, 1978, should be: "Employment policies", the discussion to be opened by Hans Apel, Federal German Finance Minister, and Willy Claes, Belgian Minister of Economics; and "Socialism and institutions in the eighties", the discussion to be opened by Pier Luigi Romita, Secretary of the Italian Social Democratic Party.

(i) The meeting also dealt with preparations for the Socialist International Party Leaders' Conference which is to be held in Tokyo on December 17-19, 1977, at the invitation of the Japan Democratic Socialist Party and the Japan Socialist Party.
The following is the full text of a position paper on the Western Sahara question adopted by the SI Bureau meeting in Madrid.

The Bureau of the Socialist International at its meeting in Madrid has considered the subject of the Western Sahara. After interventions by the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE), the President of Senegal and some other speakers and having listened to a representative from the Polisario Front and to one from the Socialist Union of Popular Forces of Morocco, the Bureau unanimously agreed:

1. The Socialist International considers that the conflict taking place in the Western Sahara represents a serious and grave danger to peace and security in the Mediterranean, so that a peaceful solution is of great importance for the region.

2. Consequently, the Socialist International considers that it is extremely urgent to obtain a negotiated solution to the conflict.

3. Such a resolution needs to take into account the inalienable rights of peoples to self-determination, in accordance with the Charter, resolutions and recommendations of the United Nations.

4. All the parties involved must take part in the dialogue leading to the solution of the conflict (including the Polisario Front).

5. In view of the seriousness of the situation, the Bureau of the Socialist International has decided to ask the President and the General Secretary of the Socialist International to make a special effort to be kept constantly informed about the course of events.
The following are the “Remarks on Disarmament” submitted to the Bureau of the Socialist International in Madrid on October 15 and 16, 1977, by the President of the International and Chairman of the German Social Democratic Party, Willy Brandt.

(1) Democratic socialists all over the world have always considered themselves protagonists of peace. It is only in peace that social progress can be realised in freedom and personal responsibility.

Freedom, justice and solidarity are the binding guide-lines of our action not only within our nations. Democratic socialists at the same time aspire to an international peace order which complies with these basic principles.

Time presses. We live in a world that is threatened in many ways although it proved possible to make peace more secure in some parts of the world, above all here in Europe. Since the end of World War II alone there have been 150 military conflicts with many millions of dead. In Europe alone potential of destruction are stored which — if used — could annihilate mankind even several times. Experts warn us that this case X could gain increasing probability unless political insight and action underwent radical change and the community of nations put into practice the policy of refraining from the use of force in international relations. We must not ignore these warnings.

(2) In the past years social democrats have created in Europe substantial preconditions for a peaceful settlement of conflicting interests. The Cold War was increasingly replaced by the will to cooperate in our part of the world. Dispassionate and realistic policy succeeded in the conclusion, across the political, military and ideological dividing lines existing in Europe, of a number of significant treaties and agreements which have made the renunciation of the use of force a central element in international relations in Europe. Thus, more cooperation became possible.

There is no realistic alternative to the policy of détente. The many foci of crisis in the world are no proof to the contrary, rather they are dramatic evidence of the fact that we suffer not from too much but — e.g. in the Middle East, in southern Africa, and in some other parts of the world — from too little détente.

The struggle for a reduction of tensions and the attempt to call a halt to the arms race are inseparably linked together. They are in keeping with the aspiration to security and stability as defined for instance, since a decade, by the concept of the Atlantic Alliance. Détente will only last if effective agreements are also reached in the military sphere. At the same time we can only hope to achieve an understanding also in these sensitive issues if all involved continue to work for a reduction of distrust and for the strengthening of the preparedness to cooperate.

We know that the policy of détente requires a process which needs permanent new efforts and which does not, at least not yet, develop automatically or without setbacks. For this very reason we welcome that the good sense has prevailed and that the Belgrade conference examines frankly the experiences since Helsinki, but then concentrates on the next phase: it is important which concrete projects are seized in the next years on the basis of Helsinki.

(3) The arms race creates instability and threatens peace. In an age in which every war can lead to the annihilation of humanity the endeavour for a control of armaments and for disarmament turns into a categorical imperative. Hence I emphasise the statement that we made at our recent congress in Geneva: “For the Socialist International, the ultimate objective continues to be that of general disarmament. It invites all governments to take suitable steps to endow this great humanitarian undertaking with real content.”

The arms race is a global problem with specific regional characteristics. More than 330 billion dollars have been spent on armaments all over the world in 1976 alone. The share of developing countries in this expenditure has soared.

The arms race is a gigantic waste of the anyhow scarce material and mental resources which are so urgently needed to build an international peace order. This waste aggravates the conflict between the fed and the hungry and thus is part of the great social issue of our time.

Every step, wherever taken, which is suitable to check this development without infringing upon external security must therefore find our unrestricted support. In view of the global character of these problems, I as President of the Socialist International call upon the governments of the world to participate, in addition to limited regional conferences, within the framework of the United Nations and to contribute realistic and effective initiatives, for instance in the Geneva disarmament conference of the disarmament commission and the conference on the advancement of the humanitarian international law of war, but especially in the UN special conference on disarmament next year.

(4) The world powers bear salient responsibility for the security of all of us. The bulk of the existing destructive potential is in their hands. Hence it is of preeminent importance that the United States and the Soviet Union should be the pacemakers of arms limitation and disarmament.

A few days ago, on October 3, 1977, the first SALT agreement which was signed in autumn 1972 expired without a continuation having been negotiated, though both sides have declared their readiness to respect
The conclusion of a second agreement on the limitation of strategic arms systems, the struggle for which has been going on for a long time, is still pending. We learnt with satisfaction that during the last weeks both sides came a good deal closer to each other. I urge with all emphasis those responsible to remove the still existing obstacles and to agree as soon as possible on a reasonable understanding. Failure of these efforts would be a grave setback for the effort to continue the policy of detente.

I should like to remind the nuclear powers in this context that they promised themselves already in the non-proliferation treaty to conduct serious negotiations towards nuclear disarmament.

In addition I call upon the great powers to honour their pledge from the Moscow test ban agreement and to conclude soon a treaty on a ban of all tests of nuclear weapons.

The Vienna talks on the mutual and balanced reduction of troops and armaments are of special importance to us in Europe. They must soon be brought to a first interim result. An agreement on SALT-II would be an additional incentive, but not a necessary precondition.

The representatives of East and West have moved towards each other during the last few years. At the same time, however, the talks have concentrated too much on discussing technical details. But the political goals of the limitation of armaments must not be lost out of sight. High-ranking political initiatives are therefore required so that also from Vienna the arms race can be checked and the security situation in Central Europe can be stabilised on a significantly lower level.

The political principle, agreed by treaty, of the renunciation of the use of force must also be reflected in the proportion of military forces. It must, therefore, be the objective of the negotiations to conclude an agreement which aims at real parity and is based on collectiveness. It is also important that at the same time concomitant measures should stabilise the situation and the arms race should be brought to a halt by means of both reductions and new maximum numbers. This would contribute to lowering the capability for a standing attack, extending pre-warning periods and reducing the dangers of incorrect assessments and false reactions. The confidence-building measures laid down in the final document of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe should, in the interest also of all European states not involved in MBFR, be extended at the actual CSCE follow-up conference in Belgrade and should be agreed upon in binding form as a concomitant measure at MBFR.

A cause of great concern is the development of arms systems which have thus far neither been included in the SALT nor MBFR negotiations. The so-called grey-zone weapons, as well as technological innovations, escape already negotiated results in other areas. Hence it is of great importance that the arms control negotiations should be extended to this field.

The representatives of East and West, growing ever faster, represent a considerable threat to peace. The search for safe jobs and the effort for modern know-how contributed to the sophisticated technological production of war material being considered a promising sector of industry. Solutions must urgently be devised as to how the armaments industries can gradually be converted to civil production without the loss of jobs. All states should take care lest the production of military goods should become a decisive component of their economic structure.

Consequently participating states should endeavour to limit their exports of armaments. The growing share of arms imports in the total imports of numerous Third World countries represents a dangerous development. While safeguarding the security of the world, it is to come to agreements which limit to a reasonable size the transfer of military goods and arms technology under international control.

The danger of an increasing proliferation of nuclear arms is growing continuously. One of the causes is that there is a growing number of states which for reasons of prestige or for the supposed defence of their existence consider possession of atomic weapons desirable. On the other hand, new dangers are conjured up by the general increase in energy demand. Hardly any country is prepared to dispense with the peaceful use of nuclear energy. This results in a special responsibility for those countries that export equipment for atomic energy: the limitation, as intended by the non-proliferation treaty, of the number of powers in possession of nuclear arms must be strongly opposed by an irresponsible export policy, and the peaceful use of atomic energy must be safeguarded by insuring their non-proliferation. Equally the countries that want to build up a nuclear capacity of their own must be prepared to co-operate in the limitation of the ensuing risks.